A Speed Race: Benelli and QJ Compete in the
International Motorbike Arena by Spigarelli F. et al.
Confirming Pages
502
C A S E  P 2 - 2
A Speed Race: Benelli and QJ Compete in the 
International Motorbike Arena
Marta Zhang, the young Chinese managing director of Italian motorcycle manufacturer Benelli, was sitting in her office in Pesaro, Italy, contemplat-ing the purchase of the company by Qianjiang Group (QJ) in 2005. After the 
Chinese won a bid to acquire the company, QJ was off to a very good start: the local 
authorities had helped to create a welcoming environment, the two production lines 
were operational, new motorbikes were being projected by skilled engineers and the 
new scooters were very attractive. 
While this new relationship began well, many differences were emerging between 
China and Italy: cultural attitude, work methods, civil and fiscal rules and access to 
credit were some areas of dispute. Despite industrial investments in order to gain effi-
ciency and reduce prices, penetration of Western markets was difficult due to a high 
level of competition, especially from Japanese brands. 
The European and United States press had welcomed the new motorbike models 
very enthusiastically, but sales results were not coherent with such technical success 
and with QJ’s plans; moreover, the technical departments in Pesaro and in China had 
not agreed on the industrial plan to produce a new motorbike, which was projected 
two years before, and already presented—with great success—to a specialist public. 
Mario Tonis, the press office director, interrupted Zhang’s thoughts with some 
good news: the motorbike tests last month had produced brilliant results with the 
press. Ultimate Motorcycling reported the following: 
Retaining the original Benelli staff and leaving all design and manufacturing still in 
Pesaro, the combination of Asian work ethic and Italian design flair has proven a potent 
combination, indeed. The result has produced several new Benelli models, and the 
Tornado, although identical in appearance to previous iterations, has evolved into a 
superbike that retains the design brilliance of the original but without its quirky nature.1 
The products were available and potentially successful, but how could Zhang integrate 
the new company, create a common corporate culture, help transfer the know-how, 
expand the business and win out over the strong Japanese competition?
1. Arthur Coldwells, “Stormbringer: Benelli Tornado Tre 1130, A Brilliant Return,” Ultimate Motorcycling, April/May 2009, 
p. 27.
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The Acquired Company
Benelli was established as a family firm in Pesaro, Italy (in the Marche Region on the 
Adriatic coast), in 1911. Initially specializing in automobile and motorcycle repairs 
as well as the manufacturing of spare parts, over the years the firm also began manu-
facturing motorcycles that were successful in various sports competitions, winning 
numerous national and international titles.
To offer a stable work for her six sons, Teresa Benelli, a young widow, opened the 
“Benelli Garage” to repair cars and motorcycles. The business was successful and the 
sons begun first to produce spare parts and then engines too. In 1920, the first engine 
was ready: a single-cylinder two-stroke 75 cc model. In the following year, the first 
Benelli motorcycle was built with a complete in-house engine of 98 cc. 
In 1923, a special model of motorcycle was projected and produced to enter race 
competitions. One of Teresa’s sons, Antonio—nicknamed “Tonino the Terrible”—
had a natural talent as a rider. Running a Benelli 175, he started a brilliant career 
winning four Italian championship titles in 1927, 1928 and 1930 with the single 
overhead camshaft model, and in 1931 with the double overhead camshaft model. 
The success in races contributed to affirm the brand and capacity of the company in 
projecting and producing competitive bikes at an international level. In 1932, during 
a race, Tonino had a terrible accident and had to stop his career. He died in 1937 in 
a road accident. 
In 1949, one of Teresa’s sons, Giuseppe, founded his own motorbike company—
Motobi—due to disagreements with his brothers. Some years later, as problems with 
the family were solved, he attached to the parent company. 
In 1962, Benelli and Motobi were able to produce about 300 motorcycles per day, 
with a workforce of 550 employees.2 Toward the end of the 1960s, growing competi-
tion with the Japanese led to the sale of Benelli to De Tomaso Industries Inc. Despite 
various attempts to differentiate itself from its Japanese competitors, as well as a merger 
with Moto Guzzi in 1988, the company’s manufacturing operations eventually ceased.3
In 1989, an entrepreneur also from the Pesaro area attempted to relaunch the com-
pany, but his efforts were unsuccessful. Operations only resumed in 1995 when the 
Indesit Group4 purchased the brand and again relaunched the company. Although 
the group focused immediately on the scooter sector (trying to gain profits from the 
high volume of production despite low margins), in 2001, the group decided to enter 
the motorcycle sector in a niche market; however, the need for sizable investments, 
coupled with enormous financial difficulties, eventually brought a halt to production 
in 2005 and sent the company into liquidation (see Exhibit 1). Following an intense 
period of negotiations for the acquisition of Benelli by the John Galt Investment Ltd. 
company owned by Russian Nikolai Smolenski, son of Alexander Smolenski,5 the 
company was eventually purchased by QJ.6
2. www.benelli.com/eng/storia.asp.
3. Francesca Spigarelli and Paola Bellabona, “The transnational dimension of the Chinese Economy,” in M. Abbiati, 
Economic and cultural characteristics of the Chinese Market, Ca’ Foscarina, Venice, 2006, p. 157.
4. The Indesit Group, the largest company in the Marche Region, Italy (€3,438 million in turnover in 2007 and 17,418 employees), 
was producing electric home appliances. The company belonged to the Merloni family. See www.indesitcompany.com.
5. Giorgio Leonardi, “A 24 year old Russian billionaire running Benelli’s bikes,” La Repubblica, July 30, 2005, p. 41, 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2005/07/30/un-miliardario-russo-di-24-anni-monta.html; accessed 
July 1, 2009; Federico De Rosa, “Benelli. A rush between Russians and Chinese. Qianjiang Motor Group is arriving,” 
Corriere della Sera, September 6, 2005, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2005/settembre/06/Benelli_testa_testa_russo_cinese_
co_9_050906051.shtml, accessed July 1, 2009.
6. Jeff Israey, “China in Italy: Kick Start,” Time, August 9, 2007,
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1651236,00.html, accessed June 30, 2009.
alo29279_part2.2_502-516.indd   503 12/15/11   7:49 PM
Confirming Pages
504 case p2-2   A Speed Race: Benelli and QJ Compete in the International Motorbike Arena
An acquisition by the Russian group would have probably resulted in the company 
being dismantled, with its machinery transferred to the United Kingdom and the loss 
not only of the brand but also of local jobs. Instead, QJ intended to relaunch the com-
pany by adopting an interesting industrial plan. 
The Acquirer Company7
QJ was situated in Wenling, China, 480 kilometres from Shanghai. QJ was a large-
scale state-owned group, and one of the 520 key state enterprises certified by the 
Chinese State Council. QJ was the largest Chinese company producing and selling 
motorcycles, with an annual output of more than one million units. It was chosen by 
the Motor Cycle Industry Association as one of the 10 best enterprises with strong 
competitive power in China. At the beginning of 2002, the “Qianjiang” trademark was 
given the award of “Famous Chinese Trademark.” 
QJ had formerly been the Wenling Chemical Engineering Machinery Factory, 
established in 1971. The factory changed its line of production to motorcycles in May 
7. The information about the acquirer company and strengths of the company is from Qianjiang Motor Company Profile 
(Gong si jie jie), www.qjmotor.com/qjmotor/JieShao/aboutus.jsp, accessed December 11, 2009; Qianjiang Motor Financial 
Report (Cai wu bao gao), First Quarter 2009 accessed December 11, 2009; www.qjmotor.com/qjmotor/newsAction.do?
method=view&id=4028882f20f0be69012108d4445e0019, accessed December 11, 2009; Qianjiang Motor Interim Report 
(Zhong qi bao gao), 2006, http://disclosure.szse.cn/m/finalpage/2006-08-17/18034278.PDF, accessed December 11, 2009.
2001
■  Launch of a new strategic plan. The main decisions concerned the following: focusing on high displacement motorcycles, 
partnerships with other producers in the scooter sector and reducing costs to be more competitive in terms of sales prices.
■  Cooperative agreement with Renault Sport in the scooter sector. The commercial purpose was to sell Benelli’s products in 
both France and Italy through the Renault network.
■  Participation in the Superbike championship with the new Tornado 900 cc. Good results helped the company win a 
consensus in the market (relaunching the company image).
2002
■  Cooperation with Renault Sport did not bring the expected results because of negative market conditions and trends.
■  Management focused on motorbike production. A new motorbike was launched: the Tornado 900 Tre, with 101 units sold 
within several months (85 per cent abroad).
■  In the scooter sector, the company looked for more flexibility by reducing stocks and outsourcing production. The most 
knowledge-intensive activities remained inside. The new Velvet 400 cc was projected.
2003
■ Benelli stopped production of scooters to focus exclusively on motorbike production.
■  The new Tornado RS model was launched, with production of 1,600 units. A new motorbike in the naked sector, the 
Tornado Naked Tre (TNT), was projected, which was due to be launched in 2004. Many orders from both Italy and abroad 
were placed by customers due to the success in the press.
2004
■  The new TNT was launched in the naked sector. Within seven months 930 units were sold. Good results in race competi-
tion supported sales activities. New versions of the TNT were projected and due to be launched in 2005 (many orders were 
already placed).
■  A new line of accessories and spare parts was projected to enter the market: high margins on those products should have 
brought higher profits to the company.
Exhibit 1 Company Activities before the Acquisition
Source: Benelli financial statements and balance sheet.
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1985, and then moved to Wenling. In January 1993, its name was changed to the 
Zhejiang Motorcycle Factory. After restructuring in 1996, the enterprise became 
Zhejiang Qianjiang Motorcycle Group. With government support, QJ successively 
merged with and acquired the Wenling Saccharification Factory, the Wenling Loco-
motive Factory, the Wenling Vehicle Repair Factory and the Wenling Electric Tools 
Factory, among others. These mergers allowed the group to achieve low-cost expan-
sion and to double its economic indicators within a short time. The Zhejiang Qianjiang 
Motorcycle Company, Ltd. was established in 1999 with the approval of the People’s 
Government of Zhejiang Province. The group was the primary founder of the subsid-
iary Zhejiang Wenling Motorcycle Company, and owned 75 per cent equity of Zhe-
jiang Meikeda Motorcycle Company, Ltd., which was co-founded with Bright Steel 
Pte. Ltd.8 Zhejiang Qianjiang Motorcycle Company, Ltd. had been a public company 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since May 14, 1999.
Strengths of the Company
The primary business of QJ was research and development (R&D), as well as the man-
ufacturing and marketing of motorcycles and engine parts. The company’s motorcycle 
products constituted approximately seven per cent of market share in China. 
The QJ Group designed, developed and produced Qianjiang machinery and electri-
cal products. It produced motorcycles ranging from 50 cc to 250 cc, and also manu-
factured motorcycle-related products such as engines and parts, as well as race cars, 
miniature motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), gas scooters, generators, high 
pressure water cleaners, garden tools, power pumps, vacuum pumps and lawn mow-
ers, among other products. Forty per cent of the group’s products were exported to 
Europe, America, the Middle East, Northeast Asia and Africa—to a total of more than 
110 countries throughout the world. 
Eight years after the company went public, it had produced and sold more than 
seven million motorcycles (among which 0.93 million were exported). Total sales 
reached RMB21.196 billion, and RMB4.537 billion was paid in taxes. Among the 
total sales, 9,377,000 finished motorcycles were sold on the domestic market and 
2,654,000 were exported, earning US$140.38 million in foreign exchange. The assets 
of QJ totaled RMB3.6 billion, with a total investment of RMB260 million. 
The company covered an area of more than seven million square feet in the Wen-
ling Economic Development Zone and was the largest motorcycle production base 
in Asia and the most advanced in China, with an annual production capacity of 1.5 
million finished motorcycles. It had one joint-stock company and five joint-venture 
companies: these included many sub-departments such as a graduate school, an R&D 
centre, a testing centre, a machine-processing factory and an assembly factory. The 
company possessed both high and new technology and first-class equipment, and uti-
lized advanced three-dimensional Pro/ENGINEER and CAD Design Software manu-
facturing technology. At the same time, it also imported advanced equipment (e.g., 
a processing-centre machine as well as a line-cutting machine, etc.) from the United 
States, Germany, Switzerland and Japan to develop its products and to process mould-
ings and machines. 
The enterprise had a complete quality management system, and was issued an 
International Organization for Standardization certificate (ISO9001) in 1997 by the 
authorized international attestation organization, TUV Product Service, Ltd. The com-
pany’s series of products passed CE, GS, CSA and UL standards and received quality 
8. Zhejiang Meikeda Motorcycle Co., Ltd. was a joint venture of the Qianjiang Group and Singapore Kedeng Investment Co., 
Ltd., with registered capital of US$2.8 million; 75 per cent of equity was held by the Qianjiang Group and 25 per cent held by 
Singapore Kedeng Investment Co., Ltd.
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licences from the National Import and Export Commodity Inspection Bureau. QJ also 
received “Well-Known Brand of China,” “Chinese Famous Trademark,” “Inspection-
free Product,” “State-level Technical Centre” and “State-level Laboratory” awards. 
International Expansion 
To upgrade its products, Qianjiang Motor cooperated with AVL—one of the two 
most important European automobile and motorcycle research institutes—and with 
a French engine design corporation that was a cooperative partner of Renault to 
develop motorcycle engines. Working with design company Bluesky Design (www.
blueskydsn.com), Qianjiang Motor developed fashionable vehicles such as dune bug-
gies, scooters, beam sport-utility vehicles and off-road vehicles for overseas markets.9
In 1999, Jiang Zuyun joined forces with QJ to sell motorcycles in the Indonesian 
market. Within two years, QJ held almost half of the Indonesian motorcycle market 
share. On August 20, 2001, the largest joint venture between China and Indonesia, 
Sanex Qianjiang Motor International (Sanex Qianjiang), inaugurated a US$12 million 
motorcycle assembly plant in Indonesia. Established as a joint venture in March 2000, 
Sanex Qianjiang was owned by Qianjiang Motor International, Malaysia’s Lion Group 
and Taiwan’s CPI, who together held 35 per cent of the shares, and Indonesia’s PT 
Sanex. Beginning in April 2000, Sanex Qianjiang imported fully-assembled motor-
cycles from its Chinese headquarter and sold them in Indonesia; however, about two 
months before the inauguration of the plant, the company gradually began to reduce 
its imports when the local plant started producing 400 to 500 units per day. The plant 
eventually had a total production capacity of 30,000 units per month. Sanex Qianjiang
thus created many employment opportunities for Indonesians. The company had 43 
main dealerships and 273 sub-dealerships across Indonesia, and it also planned to 
establish a subsidiary called PT Sanex Agung Motor Indonesia to produce spare parts 
for the company.
To target the European market, QJ established a joint venture with an Austrian 
company to create the Generic brand that would produce European-style motorcycle
products; in the meantime, QJ also acquired Hungarian company Keeway Motor, 
establishing Qianjiang-Keeway Europe. In 2005, QJ acquired Benelli. With these 
three leading brands—Benelli, Generic and Keeway—QJ was planning to build and 
expand its markets in Europe and North America, to accelerate technical innovations 
and to establish itself in a more competitive position in the international market. 
In terms of its strategic development, QJ also targeted the Taiwanese market. 
Taiwan had the highest density of motorcycles in the world, with more than 
300 motorcycles per square kilometre. Approximately 50 per cent of the population 
owned a motorcycle, and due to the high labour costs for repairs and maintenance, 
Taiwanese people preferred to buy new motorcycles rather than repairing them.10 Due to 
the new leadership in Taiwan, the relationship with mainland China had become closer 
and therefore opened up shipping, postal communications and trading connections with 
the mainland. At the same time, the production costs of local Taiwanese companies 
were increasing and the investment environment had deteriorated, thus providing a great 
opportunity for the development of the mainland motorcycle industry. Qianjiang Motor, 
located in Wenling, China, was situated to the northeast of the Taiwan Strait. In addition 
to its geographical advantages, several senior QJ executives who were dispatched by 
the foreign shareholders were Taiwanese, giving them the advantage of familiarity with 
9. X. Xia, “Qianjiang Motor: Exporting to European and American Markets,” April 30, 2007, www.atvchina.com.cn/
viewnews-7354.html, accessed December 11, 2009.
10. Q. Li, “Qianjiang Motor: Penetrating Market in Taiwan,” April 4, 2008, http://www.tzgb.com/Motorcycle/Qiyezhichuang/200804/3766.
html, accessed December 11, 2009.
alo29279_part2.2_502-516.indd   506 12/15/11   7:49 PM
Confirming Pages
Industry Analysis 507
the Taiwanese motorcycle market. QJ opened up the Taiwan market by relying on its 
geographical location, advanced techniques and competitive pricing. Its gross profits 
almost doubled due to the rise in exports to Taiwan.
Industry Analysis 
The Industry
Benelli was part of the motorcycle industry, which included companies involved in 
manufacturing motorcycles and related equipment, parts and accessories. Motorcycles 
were classified by their engine size and vehicle use. Engines were measured according 
to their displacement by cubic centimetre (cc): scooters were less than 50 cc, stan-
dard were from 50 cc to 650 cc and heavy were more than 650 cc. Motorcycles were 
usually classified for commercial purposes into one of the following three catego-
ries: street, off-road or dual-purpose, depending on the surface on which they were 
intended to be used. 
Street motorcycles were designed for riding on paved roads. Their engines were 
generally in the 125 cc and greater range. They included the following categories: 
cruiser, sport bike, touring, sport touring, naked, feet-forward motorcycles, scooters 
and mopeds. Off-road motorcycles, also known as dirt bikes, included motocross, rally 
raids, trials and track racing. Dual-purpose motorcycles were street legal motorbikes 
that were also designed for off-road situations. This class included adventure-touring, 
enduro and supermotard.
Benelli had products in both the scooter sector and in the heavy segment of the 
motorcycle industry: in the naked, sport and touring segments. With a wide range of 
scooters and standard products in a variety of models, QJ focused on the low-price 
segment of the market. Its slogan was, “Dedicated to a combination of European 
design, Japanese quality, and Chinese cost.” It also had several typical Chinese-style 
low-power motorcycles.
Global Trends
Several key competitors in the motorcycle industry shared the majority of worldwide 
sales. The industry could be described as global and highly competitive. Price, design 
and engine performance were the key elements in customer choice. Japanese manu-
facturers such as Yamaha, Suzuki, Kawasaki and Honda had large market shares in 
many countries by combining innovative designs with low prices; however, in certain 
geographic markets, a single producer may have had a dominant position due to its 
specific core competencies or due to customer loyalty. For example, this was the case 
for Harley Davidson in North America, where the company held almost one-third of 
the market (Exhibit 2),11 or of Ducati, in the sports or race segments, where the com-
pany offered high technical performance, which was supported by good sports/race 
results.12
In the period 2003–2007, the motorcycle market in the United States, Canada, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Russia and Japan grew by 4.7 per cent. The total value of 
the so-called G8 market was, at the end of 2007, of US$24.3 billion (41 per cent related to 
the United States), with a projection of a further grow of 5.1 per cent by 2012. 
11. Don J. Brown, “What’s Next for the Motor Co.?,” Dealernews, February 1, 2009, www.dealernews.com/dealernews/Research/
Whats-Next-for-the-Motor-Co/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/579349 accessed June 30, 2009. As for Ducati, see “Ducati Grows 
United States Market Share,” Motorcycleusa.com, 2009, www.motorcycle-usa.com/577/3542/Motorcycle-Article/Ducati-Grows-
United-States-Market-Share.aspx, accessed December 10, 2009.
12. As for Ducati competitive position, see “Ducati Grows United States Market Share,” Motorcycleusa.com, 2009, www.motorcycle-usa.
com/577/3542/Motorcycle-Article/Ducati-Grows-United-States-Market-Share.aspx, accessed December 10, 2009.
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An interesting trend in the global arena was due to the appearance of small 
companies, from emerging markets, Brazil, Russia, India and China in particular 
(BRIC area). Those markets were becoming more and more interesting both for 
supply and demand of motorcycles. In the period 2003–2007, the BRIC motorcycle 
market grew by 14.5 per cent and its total value was of US$27.2 billion at the end 
of 2007.13 Brazil was the fastest growing area with a compound annual growth 
rate of 28.3 per cent. Following the projections available, by 2012 the BRIC 
market should reach a value of US$67.4 billion, with an increase of 19.9 per cent 
from 2007.14
Local Trends: Italy
In Italy, the motorcycle industry was very competitive: Japanese manufacturers had 
the biggest market share, especially in the motorcycle sector. In 2008, Honda and 
Yamaha held more than 30 per cent of new vehicle registrations and gained a dominant 
position despite negative market trends (see Exhibit 3). In the same year, Kawasaki 
sold the most of a single motorcycle model (see Exhibit 4). In the scooter segment, the 
Italian Piaggio Group had a good market share.15
Benelli had a small market share in the Italian industry, operating in a niche seg-
ment. The company tried to compete with Aprilia, Ducati and Honda, but its real 
direct competitors both on the Italian market and abroad were three Italian produc-
ers: Moto Morini (Morini), MV Augusta (MV) and Triumph Motorcycles (Triumph). 
Morini was its direct competitor in terms of both proposed models and annual sales. 
Although it was in the same market segment, MV produced more exclusive/luxury 
motorcycles, with higher prices and better performance. Benelli was Triumph’s com-
petitor because these two companies were the only manufacturers of three-cylinder 
Italian motorcycles; however, in comparison to Benelli, Triumph’s market share was 
much larger (Exhibit 5).
13. “Motorcycles—Global Group of Eight (G8) Industry Guide,” Research and Markets,
www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?report_id=706788, accessed June 30, 2009.
14. “Motorcycles—BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) Industry Guide,” Research and Markets,
www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?report_id=706787, accessed June 30, 2009.
15. www.ancma.it/common/file/articolo_220sezione_7.pdf and www.ancma.it/common/file/articolo_224sezione_8.pdf,
accessed December 10, 2009.
Producer Market Share (%)
Harley Davidson 27.3
Honda 20.9
Yamaha 17,0
Kawasaki 13.8
Suzuki 12.5
KTM 2.0
BMW 1.4
Triumph 1.3
Victory 1.3
Ducati 1.0
Exhibit 2 Market share of Top 10 Motorbike Producers in the United States (Sales 
Estimates for 2008)
Source: Don J. Brown (2009), “What’s Next for the Motor Co.?” Dealernews, February 1, 2009, www.dealernews.com/
dealernews/Research/Whats-Next-for-the-Motor-Co/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/579349, accessed June 30, 2009.
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Local Trends: China
The Chinese motorcycle market was the largest in the world and accounted for 59.1 
per cent of market volume in the Asia-Pacific region (see Exhibit 6). In 2006, the 
domestic market grew by 7.9 per cent to reach a value of US$5.8 billion and a volume 
of 14.9 million units. It was projected to have a value of US$9.9 billion in 2011, an 
increase of 69.4 per cent since 2006; the forecast volume would reach 24.6 million 
units, an increase of 65.7 per cent since 2006. 
Producer Market Share (%)
Honda 19.4
Piaggio 16.3
Yamaha 14.9
Kymco 7.8
Suzuki 6.8
Altre 6.7
Aprilia 5.5
Kawasaki 4.2
BMW 3.6
Ducati 2.6
Exhibit 3 Market Share of Top 10 Motorbike Producers in Italy (% on Number of 
Registrations, February 28, 2009)
Source: Authors calculation on data from www.ancma.it/it/publishing.asp, acquired through Benelli QJ srl.
Producer Product Class Number
1 Kawasaki Z 750 Naked 6,745
2 Honda Italia Hornet 600 Naked 5,207
3 BMW R 1200 GS Enduro 5,087
4 Honda XL 700 V Transalp Enduro 4,198
5 Yamaha FZ6 Fazer Naked 4,025
6 Suzuki GSR 600 Naked 3,172
7 Ducati M 696 Naked 3,113
8 Suzuki DL650 U V-Strom Enduro 2,655
9 Kawasaki ER-6n Naked 2,560
10 BMW R 1200 R Naked 2,258
Exhibit 4 Top 10 Motorbikes Sold in Italy in 2008 (Number of Registrations)
Source: Authors calculation on data from www.ancma.it/it/publishing.asp, acquired through Benelli QJ srl.
Producers 2006 2007 2008
Benelli 262 401 484
Moto Morini 340 356 351
MV Augusta 1,987 1,891 1,274
Triumph Motorcycles 3,781 5,233 5,978
Exhibit 5 Motorbike and Scooter (more than 50 cc) Registrations per Year
Source: Authors calculation on data from www.ancma.it/it/publishing.asp, acquired through Benelli QJ srl.
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EXHIBIT 6 COUNTRY BACKGROUNDS 
China
China was the world’s second largest economy in terms of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP), and the world’s most populous 
nation. Huge trade surpluses (China was the third largest world trader) and a 
large capacity to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)—China was the world’s 
number 1 recipient of FDI—provided China with a huge amount of foreign 
reserves to be invested.16 Real GDP grew at 11 per cent from 2003 to 2007 
(Table A) and even after the economic crisis the economy was projected to 
expand at very high rates (Table B). Government stimulus packages, formally 
launched at the end of 2008 with an initial investment of about US$600 billion 
(equivalent to 13 per cent of GDP), provided a great boost to the country’s eco-
nomic growth. China would have remained the fastest-growing major economy 
in the world in the period 2009-10.17
While China’s outlook appeared promising, extraordinary economic growth 
was unbalanced and, according to some, even unsustainable. Problems included 
the growing pollution in urban and industrial areas, the unbalanced growth of the 
cities compared to the countryside, social pressures, human rights violations and 
lack of democracy.18 In the business sector, many Chinese companies that had 
entered international markets were not profitable, and they faced huge problems 
in terms of being competitive and adopting international management standards. 
Chinese companies had difficulties getting their products accepted in Western 
countries; moreover, some foreign companies were redirecting their investments 
to other emerging nations or to developing countries where they could find 
lower labor costs.
16. For a deep analysis on aspects related to Chinese outward and inward foreign direct investments see “OECD Investment 
Policy Reviews China: Encouraging Responsible Business Conduct,” OECD Publishing, 2008.
17. Economist Intelligence Unit, “China Economy: Stimulus Report Card,” http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?
layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=715063456&country_id=1800000180&page_title=Latest+analysis, accessed 
December 10, 2009.
18. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2009—China, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, London, 2009, 
www.eiu.com.
TABLE A—Outlook for China
Annual Data 2007
Historical Averages from 
2003–2007 %
Population (millions) 1,321.3 Population growth 0.6
GDP (billions of US$; market 
exchange rate) 3,46 Real GDP growth 11.0
GDP (billions of US$; PPP) 7,316 Real domestic demand growth 9.9
GDP per head (US$; market exchange 
rate) 2,620 Inflation 2.6
GDP per head (US$; PPP) 5,540 Current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
5.6
Average exchange rate RMB:US$ 7.61 FDI inflows (% of GDP) 3.0
Source: Factsheet, May 6, 2009, Economist Intelligence Unit (Country ViewsWire).
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Italy 
Italy was part of the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized nations. Its economic 
strength was in the processing and manufacturing of goods. Exports of luxury 
goods, consumer durables and investment goods led its competitiveness abroad. 
The industrial system was based mainly on small and medium-sized family-
owned firms.
Economic growth in Italy ranged from one per cent in 1996 to a 3.7 per cent 
peak in 2000 and gradually slowed down thereafter in the two periods of reces-
sion in 2003 and 2008. Recent growth rates were among the lowest of the indus-
trialized countries, due mainly to several years of low productivity growth and 
loss of competitiveness. Like many Western countries, Italy was facing the con-
sequences of the global financial turmoil, with a strong decrease in output and 
a rise in public spending after a period of substantial reductions in the budget 
deficit (Table C and Table D). The economy weakened during 2008: exports fell 
sharply due to the export structure. Investment demand also fell sharply, as did 
consumer expenditures, especially for cars and durables.
The government faced challenges related to long-term budget consolidation. 
The key issues included the extension of the pension reform process and reforms 
to improve the efficiency of public administration. At the same time, measures 
to relaunch firm competitiveness were needed to sustain an industrial system 
that was based mainly on small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
TABLE B—China’s Main Macroeconomic Data: Projections
Key Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Real GDP growth (%) 9.0 6.0 7.0 8.4 8.7 8.9
Consumer price inflation (%) 5.9 ]0.2 2.5 3.5 4.1 4.1
Budget balance (% of GDP) ]0.1 ]3.6 ]2.1 ]1.6 ]1.1 ]1.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) 10.2 6.1 4.5 3.6 2.9 2.0
Commercial bank prime rate (%) 5.6 5.4 6.6 7.0 7.1 7.4
Source: Factsheet, May 6, 2009, Economist Intelligence Unit (Country ViewsWire).
TABLE C—Outlook for Italy
Annual Data 2008 
Historical Averages from 
2004–2008 %
Population (millions) 58.1 Population growth 0.1 
GDP (billions of US$; market 
exchange rate) 2,311 Real GDP growth 0.9 
GDP (billions of US$; PPP) 1,797 Real domestic demand growth 0.9 
GDP per head (US$; market exchange 
rate) 39,744 Inflation 2.3 
GDP per head (US$; PPP) 30,910 Current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
]2.2 
Average exchange rate €:US$ 0.680 FDI inflows (% of GDP) 1.3 
Source: Factsheet, May 6, 2009, Economist Intelligence Unit (Country ViewsWire).
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Based on volume, Jiangmen Grand River Group Company, Ltd. was the leading 
player in the Chinese motorcycle market, accounting for 16.2 per cent of market 
share in 2006. In the same year, Chongqing Loncin Industry (Group) Company, Ltd. 
and China Jialing Industrial Company, Ltd. held 8.3 per cent and 7.4 per cent of 
market share respectively. Due to the lack of a dominant leading player in the mar-
ket, there was an increasing number of manufacturers, including Qianjiang Motors 
and other emerging firms that competed for the remaining 68 per cent of market 
share.
To understand actual trends in the Chinese market and QJ’s position, some back-
ground information on the Chinese legal and regulatory environment is required. 
Focusing on the exhaustion of traditional natural resources, the deterioration of the 
environment and the excessive carbon dioxide emissions, the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Technol-
ogy Information and the National Development and Reform Commission issued 
a financial compensation plan for pure electric and fuel cell-powered vehicles. 
Energy-saving and environment-protecting vehicles were leading the R&D trend. 
QJ put the development of new-energy motorcycles onto its agenda: the company 
took the lead in releasing motorcycles with an engine management system, cater-
ing to national policies. Strengthening its technical input, QJ also introduced an 
electronic control injection system, reducing noise and gas emissions; at the same 
time, QJ was devoted to developing electric and liquid gas-powered motorcycles,
as well as to participating in the formulation of national electric motorcycle 
standards. 
According to a Chinese State Council resolution, motorcycles would officially be 
included in the “to the countryside” plan. From March 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009, 
the state was to allocate RMB5 billion for farmers in the countryside to trade old 
motorcycles and automobiles for new ones. This would mean considerable growth in 
the domestic motorcycle market. In the countryside, motorcycles were indispensible 
vehicles for feed, poultry and product transport, as well as for commuting. Compared 
to computers and other home appliances, farmers relied the most on motorcycles. The 
plan would be implemented over the course of four years, until 2013. As the lead-
ing company in the domestic motorcycle industry, QJ would greatly benefit from this 
compensation policy.19 
19. L. Qu, “Great Prospects for Motorcycle Industry in China,” March 2009,
http://money.zjol.com.cn/05money/system/2009/03/31/015391068.shtml, accessed December 11, 2009.
TABLE D—Italy’s Main Macroeconomic Data: Projections
Key Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Real GDP growth (%) ]1.0 ]4.5 ]0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9
Consumer price inflation (av; %) 3.4 0.5 0.8 1.7 1.9 1.6
Consumer price inflation (av; %: EU 
harmonized measure) 3.5 0.6 0.9 1.8 2.0 1.7
Budget balance (% of GDP) ]2.7 ]5.3 ]5.2 ]3.6 ]3.7 ]3.6
Current account balance (% of GDP) ]3.2 ]2.2 ]2.0 ]3.0 ]2.8 ]2.7
Short-term interest rate (av; %) 4.6 1.7 1.8 2.6 3.5 4.1
Source: Factsheet, May 6, 2009, Economist Intelligence Unit (Country ViewsWire).
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The Acquisition
Benelli and QJ made contact for the first time in June 2005: they were looking for 
an agreement that matched their relative strengths. Benelli had a recognizable brand 
name, knowledge of Western markets and projection skills, while QJ had high-
efficiency plants and low production costs. In September 2005, a deal was reached 
concerning the founding of Benelli QJ. Industrial activities began in October 2005.
The main reasons for QJ to purchase Benelli was to utilize a well-known and 
recognized brand in terms of quality and sporting tradition, as well as to capitalize 
on Benelli’s professionalism and knowledge in order to offer a high-quality prod-
uct in segments that had not yet been penetrated by the QJ Group; therefore, the 
strategic objective of the initiative was to relaunch the Benelli brand by leveraging 
its history and tradition in order to achieve high-quality production. Benelli’s prod-
ucts and spare parts were also to be used in China in order to increase the quality 
of domestically-manufactured products and to further diversify production to new 
categories of clients. Increased efficiency and a wide range of quality products were 
expected to help QJ to compete with the leading Japanese companies in the motor-
bike market. 
At the time of the acquisition, there were no particular expectations with respect to 
Benelli’s geographic location in central Italy, but QJ actually found some competitive 
benefits in the Marche Region. There was a lot of support from local public organiza-
tions, which facilitated negotiations and helped QJ win in the “competition” with the 
Russian entrepreneur to purchase the company. The directors of QJ—which was in 
part a publicly-controlled company—welcomed the involvement of the local organi-
zations, as well as the relationships forged between the Chinese local government and 
that of town, provincial and regional organizations in Italy.
There was much unexpected common ground in terms of culture and society 
between Pesaro, the Marche Region and the location in China. In addition to being 
located in a coastal town, QJ appreciated that the people in Pesaro had a strong work 
ethic and an approach to work that was similar to that in China.
The Post-Acquisition Phase
Main Organizational and Operating Changes Introduced After the 
Acquisition
Operations relating to administration, production and R&D were maintained in 
Pesaro. The main changes related to production operations, which were restructured 
to increase capacity at the Pesaro site: innovations included an expansion of in-house 
operations, such as the three-cylinder engine assembly that had previously been out-
sourced. As a result, the original workforce of 45 at the time of purchase was increased 
to 100 employees. 
As for human resources, the sales director, parts quality manager and manag-
ing director were Chinese. The sales director was working on restructuring the 
sales network and expanding it to the West. The quality manager was handling the 
production relationship with the parent company especially to coordinate the pro-
duction of Benelli parts that were made in China and then imported for assembly. 
All of the engineers, workers and technicians were Italian. The previous technical 
director became vice managing director. Generally, Chinese employees from the 
QJ Group came to Pesaro and vice versa for short periods of time, on a rotat-
ing basis, to learn from mutual experience (especially for designing and testing of 
motors).
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For Benelli, the greatest positive changes after the acquisition included the 
following:
 ■ Efficiency-building efforts to reduce some avoidable costs that had been 
increasing with the previous owners and leading to significant losses;
 ■ A new way of managing human resources: QJ gave increased decision-making 
power and responsibility to the staff, including young employees and women. 
QJ was attempting to let all of the staff become involved in the future of the 
company, by spreading a teamwork approach through periodical meetings and 
encouraging suggestions and ideas from the bottom to the top.
Industrial Activities: Present and Future 
In 2009, two production lines were operating at the original industrial plant: one for 
engine production and assembly and one for motorcycle production and assembly. 
Before the acquisition, engines were produced and tested through outsourcing, so only 
one line of production was in use. The decision to outsource the engines had been a 
mistake: it resulted in high production costs and problems in quality and performance 
control. The Chinese thus decided to bring production in-house, following the sugges-
tions of the Italian technical director. In order to realize the new plan, the agreements 
with local professional and technical schools were reinforced, to create apprentice-
ships and subsequent placements for students. No changes were made in the relation-
ships with the local suppliers.
The QJ Group devised a challenging industrial plan for the development of the 
company, with a resulting increase in the workforce: the industrial plan involved 
manufacturing new products within four years. Motorcycle production increased from 
only three models prior to the company’s acquisition to nine in 2007 and 10 in 2008 
(Exhibit 7 shows two 2009 Benelli products). Each motorcycle model was different, 
and three new engines were used; they were designed in the technical department in 
Pesaro. Designs and prototypes were then transferred to the QJ technical department, 
where both the Chinese and Italian technical departments worked cooperatively to 
oversee the industrial development of the project. Once the industrial plan for the 
product was completed, production began in Italy.
Exhibit 7 Two 2009 Benelli products
Source: Courtesy of Benelli QJ srl.
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Prior to the acquisition, Benelli produced only one model of scooter. Since 2008, 
two new models were added to their product range. As of August 2009, there were 
four models: they were all designed and projected in Italy, completely produced in 
China by QJ, and then imported with Benelli’s brand for distribution in Italy.
A key factor in the relaunching of Benelli’s activities was to reduce production 
costs and sales prices. It was estimated that it would take 10 years to achieve a truly 
competitive price in relation to the Japanese manufacturers. More parts would be pro-
duced in China to reach this strategic goal, while all high-value—knowledge-based—
activities were maintained in Italy. While trying to win competitiveness in terms of 
price and build on QJ’s strengths, Benelli was working on QJ products to improve 
their technical performance as well as their style and design.
Benelli’s products were expected to enter the Chinese market in 2009–2010. In 
2009, import restrictions on motorbikes with a displacement of more than 250 cc were 
abolished, so sales activities could now be organized; several dealers were ready to 
sell Benelli’s motorbikes in China. Scooters would not be distributed in China because 
they were not competitive in terms of price. After the industrial plan was completed, 
the relaunching of Benelli would also focus on racing activity: QJ was planning to 
have new competitive bikes ready for the MotoGP (in the next five years) and for the 
World Superbike races.20
Sales Activities Abroad and the Commercial Network 
Another key element for improving Benelli’s competitive position and strengthening 
QJ’s competitiveness on international markets was the commercial network. Benelli’s 
business relationships abroad were being restructured, starting with the development 
of new branches in Europe and the United States. A great part of Benelli’s sales came 
from the European Union, particularly in Italy. Germany was the most important for-
eign market. The second most important foreign market for Benelli should have been 
the United States; however, there was a big differential between sell in and sell out 
(i.e., the number of imported motorbikes and the number of motorbikes sold). The key 
problems related to sales in the United States were customer-assistance services and 
distribution channels. The United Kingdom was another important market. 
The Italian commercial network was based on 179 official sellers: 30 per cent located 
in the north, 33 per cent in the centre and 37 per cent in the south. Benelli also set up 
21 “authorized workshops,” eight in the north, three in the centre and 48 in the south. 
The distribution network abroad consisted primarily of joint subsidiaries with 
Benelli and KW brand products. KW was a new brand intended to sell scooters: it 
was launched by the group after the acquisition of the Hungarian company Keeway 
(later Qianjiang-Keeway Europe). These brands were differentiated by their price and 
quality, but they were sold through the same network. Aside from the KW subsidiar-
ies, the commercial network was based on official importers—usually one for each 
country—that sold to different dealers. The dealers did not usually operate as mono-
brand sellers. Benelli had importers in 37 countries across Europe, Asia and America.
QJ’s commercial strategy was differentiated on the basis of the geographic area: 
while there was a strong sales network in Indonesia through dealers and subdealers, 
Qianjiang Motor kept its sales away from the Southeast Asian market where national 
brands grouped together to compete and force down prices. Companies in countries 
such as Vietnam mainly relied on low prices to compete, and Qianjiang’s prices were 
entirely uncompetitive. 
20. Aaron Frank, “Benelli, BMW, and MV Agusta—Onward and Upward,” Motorcyclist, www.motorcyclistonline.com/ 
newsandupdates/122_0804_benelli_bmw_mv_agusta/index.html, accessed December 10, 2009.
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QJ was now turning to the North American and European markets. Europe had a 
very strict technical standard to pass as a threshold, so it was difficult to enter the mar-
ket. In Europe, motorcycle repairs had a high cost per hour that could erode the mar-
gins made through sales. Therefore, first-rate products with good quality were needed 
to enter the European market.
What Is Next?
After the acquisition, some problems arose due to the cultural differences between 
the Chinese and the Italians in terms of behaviour, specifically concerning business 
approach. Human relationships were difficult due to different mentalities, habits and 
background. Problems stemmed not only from differing organizational cultures, but 
also from the differing working environments in China and Italy.
There were many examples of such communication problems in the technical area. 
The Chinese and the Italian technical departments should have worked together in 
harmony to combine and optimize their complementary skills; however, working 
together was difficult due to language and cultural differences. These problems were 
delaying the development of important projects. 
Another critical field was that relating to rules and laws. In some cases, admin-
istrative actions were perceived as nonsense by both Italians and Chinese. Behav-
iours relating to specific Italian fiscal or civil rules were sometimes judged as “wrong” 
by the Chinese; likewise, Chinese rules seemed “strange” or unacceptable to Italian 
employees. In this sense, the problem facing Benelli and its new Chinese owners con-
cerned how to improve cross-cultural understanding. Problems in communications 
and cultural differences created a rift between management and employees, impeding 
the implementation of strategy and harming the company’s potential.
Other difficulties in managing the “new” Benelli were due to the great focus on 
efficiency, which also had negative consequences. Domestic consumers in China were 
price-oriented: in general, this resulted in Chinese companies paying more attention to 
reducing costs and cutting investments that had long-term or intangible returns. QJ’s 
international expansion required it to give up this traditional way of doing business 
and to reconsider the low-cost approach. This focus on cost-savings led the company 
to give less importance to sales promotion. 
A key problem for Benelli and its new Chinese owners was to improve the world-
wide strength of the brand as well as the effectiveness of the sales network to increase 
market share. Benelli’s products, especially its motorcycles, had a huge potential to 
compete with the most important players in the market, but their market share in both 
Europe and in the United States was low. QJ had expected fewer problems in pen-
etrating the western market through the Benelli brand; however, delays were caused 
as a result of having to rebuild and relaunch the brand image internationally, as well 
as having to re-establish international supplier relationships. Marketing investments, 
especially for sales promotion, post-sales assistance and customer care were needed.
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